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INTRODUCTION 
Revenge has played a role in criminal justice systems for thousands 
of years. From the Code of Hammurabi, to the Bible, to modern 
Supreme Court jurisprudence, revenge, or “getting even,” has been a 
consideration in how wrongdoers are punished, especially with respect 
to the imposition of the death penalty. Historically, revenge has not 
been viewed as a legitimate justification for punishment under 
American legal principles. However, in the past year, both the United 
States Supreme Court and the Department of Justice have signaled that 
revenge may well have a legitimate role in justifying the death penalty. 
This Note will explore the development of revenge as a justification 
for punishment in the American criminal justice system. It will begin 
by showing that recent remarks from the bench and the Department of 
Justice signal a willingness to consider the effects of revenge on crime 
victims. It will then analyze the concept of revenge as part of a criminal 
justice system and discuss the United States Supreme Court’s historical 
views on revenge as a justification for the death penalty. Next, this Note 
will investigate revenge’s role in the Victims’ Rights Movement, 
specifically how revenge factors into victim impact statements. Finally, 
this Note ultimately asserts that revenge is not and should not be a goal 
of the criminal justice system given the public policy implications. 
I. MOVE TOWARDS REVENGE? 
The Supreme Court has well-developed jurisprudence on the death 
penalty, specifically the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and 
unusual punishment. However, not until 2019 has revenge been implied 
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as an acceptable purpose of capital punishment. In Bucklew v. 
Precythe,1 the Court arguably acknowledged the appropriateness of the 
offender’s suffering (i.e., revenge) in the administration of the death 
penalty.2 In 1997, Bucklew was convicted of murder and rape in 
Missouri and sentenced to death by lethal injection.3 Bucklew claimed 
to suffer from a medical condition which would cause him tremendous 
pain if the lethal injection was administered.4 After a series of state and 
federal appeals, the case came before the Supreme Court.5 
On April 1, 2019, Justice Gorsuch, writing for a five member 
majority, rejected Bucklew’s claims, holding that when a convict who is 
sentenced to death challenges the state’s method of execution on 
Eighth Amendment grounds, he or she must demonstrate that 
alternative, less painful methods of execution are viable.6 In so ruling, 
Justice Gorsuch remarked that the Eighth Amendment “does not 
guarantee a prisoner a painless death—something that isn’t guaranteed 
to many people, including most victims of capital crimes.”7 
It is difficult to argue that Justice Gorsuch was not acknowledging 
the proportionality of suffering between a capital crime victim and a 
person convicted of that offense. In fact, Justice Gorsuch appears to 
justify the pain which may be suffered by the wrongdoer in the course 
of carrying out the death penalty because of the pain inflicted on the 
victim. The opinion has been widely criticized by death penalty 
opponents.8 
The implication that revenge is an acceptable justification for 
capital punishment did not stop with the Supreme Court. On July 25, 
2019, United States Attorney General William Barr announced that the 
Trump Administration, after a sixteen year federal hiatus, would 
 
 1. Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019). 
 2. Id.  
 3. Id. at 1119.  
 4. Id. at 1120.  
 5. Id. at 1122.  
 6. Id. at 1123. 
 7. Id. at 1124 (emphasis added). Justice Gorsuch also addressed the impact of delays in the 
imposition of Bucklew’s sentence on the victims’ families: “The people of Missouri, the surviving 
victims of Mr. Bucklew’s crimes, and others like them deserve better.” 139 S. Ct. at 1133.  
 8. See, e.g., John D. Bessler, Bucklew v. Precythe: The Supreme Court’s Tortured Death 
Penalty Jurisprudence, GEO. WASH. L. REV. (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.gwlr.org/bucklew-v-
precythe-the-supreme-courts-tortured-death-penalty-jurisprudence/ (arguing that the Court 
ignores modern understandings of torture in its holding.); Elie Mystal, Neil Gorsuch Just Made 
Death Worse, THE NATION, (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/neil-
gorsuch-death-penalty-bucklew/. 
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resume federal executions.9 In a press release announcing the policy 
decision, Attorney General Barr stated that, “the Justice Department 
upholds the rule of law—and we owe it to the victims and their families 
to carry forward the sentence imposed by the justice system.”10 
Attorney General Barr directed the Bureau of Prisons to adopt a 
proposed Addendum to the Federal Execution Protocol authorizing 
the executions of five individuals to proceed.11 
Attorney General Barr’s actions were swiftly met with litigation by 
death penalty opponents challenging the reinstatement of the federal 
death penalty. Courts have expressed a general reluctance to agree with 
the Justice Department’s policy shift. In October 2019, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit blocked the execution of 
one of the convicts scheduled to be put to death pursuant to the new 
Execution Protocol.12 On November 20, 2019, Judge Chutkan of the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia issued an 
injunction effectively prohibiting the executions of the remaining four 
individuals.13 
In response to Judge Chutkan’s decision, Attorney General Barr 
claimed that he would, if necessary, appeal to the Supreme Court to 
effectuate the Administration’s decision to reimpose the death 
penalty.14 In a November 21, 2019 interview with the Associated Press, 
 
 9. Press Release, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Federal Government to Resume Capital 
Punishment After Nearly Two Decades Lapse (July 25, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/ 
pr/federal-government-resume-capital-punishment-after-nearly-two-decade-lapse [hereinafter 
DOJ Press Release]. The federal death penalty was reinstated in 1988 for a narrow class of 
offenses. 18 U.S.C. § 111(a) (1988) (amended 1994). The Federal Death Penalty Act was enacted 
in 1994 and greatly expanded the number of death penalty eligible offenses under federal law. 18 
U.S.C. § 3591 (1994). Since 1988, only 3 federal inmates have been executed: Timothy McVeigh, 
the Oklahoma City bomber, executed in 2001; Juan Gurza, convicted of murder and drug 
trafficking, executed in 2001; and Louis Jones Jr., convicted of the rape and murder of a fellow 
Army Pvt., executed in 2003. There are currently 62 federal death row inmates. DEATH PENALTY 
INFORMATION CTR., http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/federal-death-penalty/ 
list-of-federal-death-row-prisoners (last visited Dec. 8, 2019). 
 10. See DOJ Press Release, supra note 9.  
 11. Id. 
 12. Mitchell v. United States, No. 18–17031, slip op. at 3 (9th Cir. Oct. 4, 2019).  
 13. Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Execution Protocol Cases ex rel. Roane v. Barr, No. 19-mc-
145, slip op. at 1 (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 2019); see also Katie Benner, Judge Blocks Scheduled 
Executions of Federal Death Row Inmates, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2019/11/21/us/politics/justice-department-death-penalty-barr.html (summarizing the opinion’s 
reason for decision: that executions would prevent inmates from challenging the use of legal 
injection in the courts.).  
 14. Michael Balsamo & Colleen Long, AP Exclusive: The DOJ Would Take Halted 
Executions to High Court, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 21, 2019), https://apnews.com/d0ddb30f2b 
214bc19da9a03305ac44de. Attorney General Barr followed through on his promise of appealing 
the decision to the Supreme Court after the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
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Attorney General Barr confirmed that the decision to proceed with the 
executions was motivated by concerns for the victims of crimes. 
Attorney General Barr stated, “[t]here are people who would say these 
kinds of delays are not fair to the victims.”15 
The Justice Department’s decision to resume executions may well 
have been a rational and apolitical decision. At worst, it can be viewed 
as the result of a politicized Justice Department utilizing the death 
penalty to invigorate potential populous support. But to see the 
nation’s highest court invoking such language is cause for greater 
concern. Together these statements seem to suggest that revenge has 
become a legitimate justification for the death penalty in America. 
II. THE CONCEPT OF REVENGE 
Much has been written about the role of revenge in the evolution 
and administration of what societies consider “justice.”16 Webster’s 
Dictionary defines “revenge” as “to inflict damage, injury, or 
punishment in return for (an injury, insult, etc.).”17 Revenge has 
alternatively been defined as “openly inflicting on the wrongdoer the 
same kind of harm he inflicted (because he wronged the victim in that 
way).”18 Interestingly, revenge is not defined in Black’s Law Dictionary. 
This historical concept of revenge has generally imposed a 
proportionality requirement. In Exodus, the Bible teaches that “you are 
to take life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth . . . . “19 This 
proportionality requirement gave rise to the ancient law of lex 
 
Columbia Circuit refused to vacate Judge Chutkan’s injunction. On Dec. 6, 2019, the Supreme 
Court also declined to vacate the District Court. However, Justices Alito, Gorsuch, and 
Kavanaugh expressed the opinion that the Administration would ultimately prevail on the issue 
of reimposing the federal death penalty. Barr v. Roane, 140 S. Ct. 353 (2019). 
 15. Balsamo & Long, supra note 14.  
 16. See, e.g., SUSAN JACOBY, WILD JUSTICE: THE EVOLUTION OF REVENGE 139 (1983) 
(considering the role of psychology in the criminal justice process, specifically emotional 
responses which fuel a desire to seek an equitable outcome). See generally Lynne N. Henderson, 
The Wrongs of Victim’s Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937 (1985) (exploring the impact and rationales 
for the development of victims’ rights programs). 
 17. WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 1245 (Coll. Ed. 
1964).  
 18. Michael Davis, Revenge, Victim’s Rights and Criminal Justice, 14 INT’L J. OF APPLIED 
PHIL. 119, 123 n. 1 (2000). 
 19. Exodus 21:23-25 (New International Version). 
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talionis,20 a system of justice “under which punishment should be in 
kind—an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, and so on⎯but no more.”21 
Understood as a proportional payback for wrongs done to another, 
revenge finds no place in modern theories of punishment. There are 
two basic theories advanced for the justification of punishment, both of 
which ultimately reject revenge as legitimizing criminal penalties. One 
fundamental theory of punishment is utilitarianism, which asserts that 
punishment is justified only if it furthers the forward-looking societal 
goals of: (1) rehabilitating the criminal; (2) deterring the criminal 
(specific deterrence) or others (general deterrence) from engaging in 
similiar criminal behavior; or (3) incapacitating the criminal in order to 
protect society from his future, wrongful conduct.22 According to 
utilitarian theory, only punishment which furthers these goals is 
legitimate. Because it does not further these societal goals, utilitarians 
reject revenge and lex talionis as a basis for punishment, even if its 
imposition would promote proportionality.23 
The second fundamental theory justifying punishment is 
retribution, which rejects the exclusivity of societal goods of 
punishment, concluding instead that wrongdoers must be punished 
because a wrong was committed.24 Retributionists also generally reject 
the notion of revenge as a basis for punishment, concluding that the 
wrong was committed against society and that it is society’s, rather than 
the injured individual’s, obligation to administer punishment.25 
Professor George Fletcher described the distinction between 
retribution and revenge in a pointed manner: retribution “is not to be 
identified with vengeance or revenge, any more than love is to be 
 
 20. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (translating lex talionis as “[t]he law of 
retaliation”). 
 21. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). In Payne v. Tennessee, the Supreme Court 
recognized the lex talionis doctrine as meaning “an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.” 501 U.S. 
808, 819 (1991). Justice Gorsuch’s assertion that, because capital crime victims often do not suffer 
painless deaths, those convicted of their murders should suffer too, leads to the virtually 
inescapable conclusion that Justice Gorsuch was referring to revenge in the Bucklew opinion. 
Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112 (2019). 
 22. See Steven Eisenstat, Revenge, Justice and Law: Recognizing the Victim’s Desire for 
Vengeance as a Justification for Punishment, 50 WAYNE L. REV. 1115 (2005) (recognizing 
rehabilitation, deterrence and incapacitation were the social changes that criminal punishment 
was intended to effectuate).  
 23. Id. 
 24. See Karsten J. Struhl, Retributive Punishment and Revenge, in WHEN YOUNG PEOPLE 
BREAK THE LAW: DEBATING ISSUES ON PUNISHMENT FOR JUVENILES 104, 108-10 (Karsten J. 
Struhl & Kimora, 2015). 
 25. Id. 
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identified with lust.”26 Stated in less colorful terms, retribution is often 
aligned with “justice” and revenge is seen as an impulsive act of 
retaliating that is not necessarily motivated by justice.27 With revenge, 
someone is taking pleasure in the suffering of the subject person 
whereas with retribution, satisfaction is being experienced solely from 
the fact that justice is being served.28 
Therefore, revenge, in the context of criminal punishment, was 
widely seen as unjust and rejected as a legitimate reason for the 
imposition of penalties. In a frequently cited article, Dr. Leon Seltzer 
describes five reasons why revenge does not correspond with justice: 
(1) Revenge is predominantly emotional while justice 
predominantly rational. Justice is about righting a wrong while 
revenge is about getting even or experiencing pleasure in the 
suffering of others. 
(2) Revenge is personal while justice is impersonal and impartial. 
Revenge is little more than the carryout of a private vendetta while 
justice involves a search for moral correctness in situations where 
societal standards have been violated. 
(3) Revenge is an act of vindictiveness. Justice seeks vindication. 
Justice assumes a foundation in honor, fairness and virtue. With 
revenge comes ever-present “two wrongs don’t make a right.” 
(4) Revenge can lead to never ending and ever-increasing cycles of 
violence. Justice seeks closure. 
(5) Revenge is nothing more than an expression of hatred, rage and 
spite. Justice is restorative and seeks to find the preexisting balance 
of equity between the wrongdoer and society.29 
Author Xarissa Holdaway argues that “justice does not require 
revenge.”30 She invokes the views of John Locke for the proposition 
that “punishment should only go so far as calm reason and conscience 
 
 26. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 417 (Oxford Univ. Press 2000).  
 27. Struhl, supra note 24, at 112.  
 28. See Jonathon Jacobs, The Retributive Theory of Punishment, in WHEN YOUNG PEOPLE 
BREAK THE LAW: DEBATING ISSUES ON PUNISHMENT FOR JUVENILES 53, 53-54 (Karsten J. 
Struhl & Kimora, 2015).  
 29. Leon F. Seltzer, Don’t Confuse Revenge with Justice: Five Key Differences, PSYCHOLOGY 
TODAY, Feb. 6, 2014, https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/evolution-the-self/201402/don-t-
confuse-revenge-justice-five-key-differences. 
 30. Xarissa Holdaway, Justice v. Revenge: The Question Beneath the Question of Prison 
Reform, RELIGIOUS DISPATCHES, July 23, 2015, https://religiondispatches.org/justice-v-revenge-
the-question-beneath-the-question-of-prison-reform/ (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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dictates[]” and notes that “Locke leaves little room for hot blooded 
vengeance.”31 
Some consider the role revenge plays in honoring those who have 
been lost. This may well have been the point being made by Attorney 
General Barr in commenting upon what we “owe” to the victims of 
capital crimes.32 In other words, revenge may act as a means through 
which those on Earth may pursue the victim’s cause on their behalf. 
Michael Igantieff, a leading human rights commentator, states that 
“[r]evenge is a profound moral desire to keep faith with the dead, to 
honor their memory by taking up their cause where they left off.”33 
Those opposed to the concept of revenge having any role in 
criminal justice go so far as to declare it sinful. Opponents of revenge 
cite to the New Testament passage that “God declares, Dearly beloved, 
avenge not yourselves, but rather give place unto wrath: for it is written 
vengeance is mine: I will repay so it’s the Lord.”34 Therefore, only God 
and those acting on his behalf—such as kings reigning under the divine-
right theory—have a moral right to impose any form of punishment. 
Perhaps Sir Francis Bacon summarized best the view that revenge 
is immoral and has no place in the law: 
Revenge is a kind of wild justice; which the more man’s nature runs 
to the more ought law to weed it out. For as far as the first wrong, it 
doth but offend the law; but the revenge of that wrong putteth the 
law out of office. Certainly, in taking revenge, a man is but even with 
his enemy; but in passing it over, he is superior for it is a prince’s 
part to pardon.35 
It is impossible to harmonize the views of Francis Bacon with those 
expressed by Justice Gorsuch or Attorney General Barr. For Bacon, 
revenge “doth but offend the law.”36 In the opinions of Justice Gorsuch 
and Attorney General Barr, the perpetrators of capital crimes deserve 
 
 31. Id.  
 32. See DOJ Press Release, supra note 9  (“The Justice Department upholds the rule of law 
– and we owe it to the victims and their families to carry forward the sentence imposed by our 
justice system.”). 
 33. Brandon Hamber & Richard A. Wilson, Symbolic Closure Through Memory, 
Reparation, and Revenge in Post-Conflict Societies, 1 J. OF HUM. RTS. 35 (2002). This notion is 
consistent with Attorney General Barr’s stated motivation for reinstituting the death penalty: to 
be take up the cause of victims to exact revenge for wrongs committed.  
 34. Romans 12:19. 
 35. Francis Bacon, Of Revenge, Essays or Counsels (1625), https://www.gutenberg.org/ 
files/575/575-h/575-h.htm#link2H_4_0004.   
 36. Id. 
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to suffer for the pain they inflicted on their victims, and society owes it 
to the victims and their families to see that this “justice” is done. 
III. REVENGE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 
A. The Supreme Court Weighs the Role of Revenge with Respect to the 
Death Penalty 
Given the rejection of revenge by both the utilitarian and 
retributive schools, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court 
historically has taken a dim view on the role of revenge in death penalty 
cases. This perspective came to light in the landmark 1972 case of 
Furman v. Georgia.37 In Furman, the Supreme Court considered three 
consolidated death penalty cases.38 The sole question considered by the 
Court was whether “the imposition and carrying out of the death 
penalty in these cases constitute[s] cruel and unusual punishment in 
violation of the Eighth39 and Fourteenth40 Amendments[.]”41 
In a one paragraph per curiam opinion, the Court ruled 5-4 that the 
death penalty constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.42 Every Justice wrote a 
separate opinion. Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White found that the 
death penalty was unconstitutional, but not unredeemably so.43 The 
balance of the majority, Justices Marshall and Brennan, declared the 
death penalty to be unconstitutional in all cases.44 
Both Justices Marshall and Brennan addressed what they saw as the 
illegitimacy of revenge playing a role in the imposition of the death 
penalty. Justice Marshall concluded that “retaliation, vengeance and 
retribution have been roundly condemned as intolerable aspirations 
 
 37. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 38. Id. at 240. 
 39. The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that, “[e]xcessive bail shall 
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. 
CONST. amend. VIII.  
 40. The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution makes applicable to the States the 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Furman, 408 U.S. at 241; U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV. 
 41. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239–40. 
 42. Id. at 240.  
 43. Id. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 310 (White, 
J., concurring). 
 44. Id. at 314 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 257 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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for a government in a free society.”45 Considering revenge and 
retribution as identical,46 Justice Marshall declared that retribution “for 
its own sake is improper”47 and that “no one has ever seriously 
advanced retribution as a legitimate goal of our society.”48 Concluding 
that retribution and revenge are immoral as justifications for the 
imposition of the death penalty, Justice Marshall opined: “I cannot 
believe that at this stage in our history, the American people would ever 
knowingly support purposeless vengeance. Thus, I believe that the great 
mass of citizens would conclude on the basis of the material already 
considered that the death penalty is immoral and therefore 
unconstitutional.”49 
Justice Brennan similarly condemned the concepts of retribution or 
vengeance as justifications for the death penalty: 
In the United States, as in other nations in the western world, the 
struggle about this punishment [(i.e., the death penalty)] has been 
one between ancient and deeply rooted beliefs in retribution, 
atonement or vengeance, on the one hand, and on the other, beliefs 
in the personal value and dignity of the common man that were born 
of the democratic movement of the eighteenth century.50 
Justice Brennan concluded, “[a]s the history of the punishment of death 
in this country shows, our society wishes to prevent crimes; we have no 
desire to kill criminals simply to get even with them.”51 
The practical effect of the Court’s decision in Furman was to 
impose a de facto moratorium on all death sentences pending as of the 
 
 45. Id. at 343. 
 46. Unlike Justice Marshall, many commentators have distinguished between revenge, 
which is the pursuit of vindicating what is perceived as a private wrong, from retribution, which is 
generally recognized as the carrying out by the government of a lawfully imposed penalty. See, 
e.g., Eisenstat, supra note 22, at 1162 (“[Retributivists] justify punishment upon society’s right to 
demand that wrongdoers be punished, not because of an inherent right of victims to see their 
victimizers punished. Thus, most advocates of retributive theory are careful to distinguish their 
beliefs from the ‘wicked’ emotion of revenge.”). However, this distinction has been criticized as 
the very concept of revenge or “payback” is the root of the meaning of retribution. The etymology 
of the term is from the Latin “re” and “tribno” which means to pay back. MERRIAM-WEBSTER 
UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam webster.com/dictionary/retribution (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2020).  
 47. Furman, 408 U.S at 345.  
 48. Id. at 363. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 296. 
 51. Id. at 305. 
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date of the decision. Death sentences were effectively reduced to 
sentences of life imprisonments.52 
However, the moratorium on the death penalty was short-lived. A 
substantial segment of the American people were fundamentally 
opposed to the Supreme Court’s elimination of the death penalty.53 
Consequently, following the Court’s decision in Furman, a number of 
states amended their death penalty statutes in an effort to comply with 
the guidelines laid down by the Court and reinstate capital punishment 
in their respective jurisdictions.54 Defendants in five of these states 
were convicted of murder, sentenced to death, and had their 
convictions and sentences upheld by the respective state supreme 
courts.55 Each petitioned the Supreme Court requesting that the death 
penalty be deemed a violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, and therefore unconstitutional for all purposes.56 
These cases were consolidated for appeal in Gregg v. Georgia, in 
which the Court expressly recognized the constitutionality of the death 
penalty.57 Of significance to the Court’s conclusion was its finding that 
no fewer than thirty-five states and the United States Congress had 
revised their death penalty statutes to comply with the dictates of 
Furman.58 The Court took these actions as an “indication of society’s 
endorsement of the death penalty for murder.”59 
Justice Stewart, in delivering the opinion of the Court, expressly 
recognized the legitimacy of societal retribution. He observed: 
The instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and 
channeling that instinct in the administration of justice serves an 
important purpose in promoting the stability of a society governed 
by law. When people begin to believe that organized society is 
unwilling or is unable to impose upon criminal offenders the 
 
 52. Neil Vidmar & Phoebe Ellsworth, Public Opinion and the Death Penalty, 26 STAN. L. 
REV. 1245, 1245 (1974). 
 53. Id. at 1249–50. 
 54. Id. at 1249. 
 55. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 161 (1976) (“The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed 
the convictions . . . .”). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 207. 
 58. Id. at 179–80. The Court in Gregg expressly pointed out that new state statutes attempted 
to address specific concerns of the Court in Furman, namely the specification of factors to be 
weighed and the procedures to be followed when deciding the applicability of a capital sentence, 
and making the death penalty required for certain crimes. Id. at 180.  
 59. Id. 
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punishment, they “deserve” then there are sown the seeds of 
anarchy of self-help vigilante justice and lynch law.60 
Thus, the Court moved in two years from Justice Brennan’s statement 
in Furman that Americans have no desire to impose the death penalty 
in order to “get even,” to Justice Stewart’s majority opinion that, for 
the good of an organized society, criminal offenders must get the 
punishment they deserve, including the death penalty.61 
Another potential cause underlying the legislative response to 
Furman cited by the Gregg majority is the view that the American 
criminal justice system needed to place a renewed and sharpened focus 
on victims’ rights. Victims of crime in America felt disrespected, 
powerless, marginalized, and generally humiliated.62 Their state 
legislators—and ultimately the Supreme Court in Gregg—reflected 
this frustration. 
There are a number of reasons why victims of crimes in America 
continue to believe they are neglected. First, key decisions are made by 
the prosecutor, including the exercise of discretion to forego 
prosecution entirely without the victim’s consent or input.63 Second, 
law enforcement and prosecutorial officials may make errors that result 
in a dismissal of charges, an unreasonable delay in the administration 
of justice, or even an acquittal that leaves a victim feeling helpless and 
unsatisfied.64 Third, the victim cannot control how the case against the 
offender is pursued.65 Fourth, the prosecutor has virtually unlimited 
discretion to enter into a plea deal, which likely results in the defendant 
receiving a lesser penalty, and which may be seen by the victim as 
disproportional to his or her suffering.66 Finally, the victim has no real 
voice in the sentencing process.67 
 
 60. Id. at 183. 
 61. The concept of exacting collective revenge (i.e., giving defendants the punishment “they 
deserve”) has also been framed in terms of morality. As Graeme Newman, a leading criminal 
justice scholar, observed, “[p]unishment may or may not teach right and wrong. The important 
fact is that it supports the morality of social order.” GRAEME R. NEWMAN, THE PUNISHMENT 
RESPONSE 290 (2d ed. 1978). 
 62. See Eisenstat, supra note 22, at 1144–48 (summarizing cases in which crime victims were 
marginalized by the criminal justice system). 
 63. See Eisenstat, supra note 22, at 1144 (“Decisions made by the district attorney’s office . . . 
are binding up on the victim.”).  
 64. See id. (“Errors made by law enforcement officers which cause incriminating evidence to 
be excluded from trial . . . are similarly binding upon the victim.”). 
 65. See id. (“[Victims] had no control over choosing who their agent will be, no do they have 
any power to control how their ‘agent’ pursues ‘their’ case.”). 
 66. See id. ([Victims] cannot appeal the decision, nor can they file their own criminal suit.”). 
 67. See id. (“The fact that the victim is not a party to the criminal suit, and thus has no 
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There are two examples of cases demonstrating the well-grounded 
frustration felt by victims. In Linda R.S. v. Richard D.,68 the Supreme 
Court held that a crime victim does not have standing to enjoin a 
prosecutor’s refusal to enforce a statute criminalizing the non-payment 
of child support.69 The Court recognized that a victim of a crime cannot 
compel a prosecution because “a private citizen lacks a judicially 
cognizable interest in the prosecution or non-prosecution of another.”70 
The decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 
Commonwealth v. Hagen further exemplifies the issue of victim 
frustration with the criminal justice system.71 In 1987, James Kelly was 
convicted of several serious offenses, including the rape, assault, and 
battery of Debra Hagen.72 In April 1988, Kelly was sentenced to two 
concurrent ten-year sentences for the rape conviction and one 
concurrent five-year sentence for the assault and battery conviction.73 
Kelly then filed a motion to stay the execution of his sentence pending 
disposition of his motion for a new trial on the basis of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.74 The motion to stay his sentence was granted in 
1988.75 
Through a series of court delays, Kelly’s motion for a new trial was 
denied, but not until four years later, in May 1992.76 Kelly appealed that 
decision.77 Through yet another series of delays, his appeal remained 
pending eight years later. Consequently, though thirteen years had 
passed since his conviction, Kelly had yet to serve time for his crimes. 
In May 2001, Hagen, the rape victim, filed a motion to lift the stay of 
execution of Kelly’s sentence.78 The trial court dismissed her motion.79 
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that as a 
 
standing to question rulings of law, or pronouncement of sentences, has far reaching implications 
for the victim.”). With the advent of victim impact statements, victims gained a voice in the 
sentencing process. See infra Section III.B.  
 68. 410 U.S. 614 (1973). 
 69. Id. at 619. 
 70. Id.  
 71. Hagen v. Commonwealth, 772 N.E.2d 32 (Mass. 2002). 
 72. Id. at 34.  
 73. Id.  
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. at 34–35. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. at 33.  
 79. Id. at 34.  
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victim of the crime, Hagen did not have standing to move for the 
revocation of Kelly’s stay of his sentence.80 
Many experts believe that by denying victims an outlet for their 
anger, frustration, and resentment, courts deprive victims of the 
ameliorative and positive benefits which may be experienced when 
revenge is imposed. As observed by criminologist Charles Barton, 
victims experience a sense of relief and unburdening of feelings of 
humiliation, resentment, and anger when permitted to exact revenge.81 
Moreover, if the victim is permitted to experience some sense of 
revenge, he or she is likely to regain self-worth, a feeling often lost upon 
being victimized.82 
It is also imperative that no one be seen by victims as above the law, 
especially the wrongdoer. Society must make every effort to avoid the 
evil of impunidad: the phenomenon of offenders getting away with 
their crimes.83 The balance of power must be meaningfully restored to 
those wronged by the criminal acts of another. 
B. The Victims’ Rights Movement 
The national recognition that the rights of victims were either being 
ignored or undervalued has led to what is generally described as the 
“victims’ rights movement.”84 Currently, every state and the federal 
government has passed laws which afford victims of crimes certain 
rights and protections as well as some participatory role in the criminal 
justice system.85 
The victims’ rights movement was born primarily out of the 
unacceptably high crime rates of the 1960s and 1970s and the 
confluence of the women’s movement and nascent victims’ 
 
 80. Id.  
 81. See CHARLES K. B. BURTON, GETTING EVEN: REVENGE AS A FORM OF JUSTICE 62 
(1981) (discussing the “sense of satisfaction which is felt by victims and those close to them when 
due punishment is imposed on their wrongdoers”).  
 82. Id. 
 83. See George P. Fletcher, The Place of Victims in the Theory of Retribution, 3 BUFF. CRIM. 
L.  REV. 51, 62 (1999).  
 84. Victims’ Rights, NATIONAL CENTER FOR VICTIMS OF CRIMES, http://victimsofcrime. 
org/help/for-crime-victims/get-help-bulletins-for-crime-victims (December 18, 2019). 
 85. See Office of Justice Programs, About Victims’ Rights, https://www.victimlaw.org/ 
victimlaw/pages/victimsRight.jsp (last visited March 15, 2020) (“Today, every state, the District 
of Columbia, and several territories have an extensive body of basic rights and protections for 
victims of crime within its statutory code.”). 
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compensation programs.86 The underlying purpose of the movement’s 
founding was seemingly to build resources and support for struggling 
victims of crimes. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, the United States faced an unprecedented 
surge in violent crime. The national homicide rate multiplied by more 
than two and a half times, from a low of 4.0 homicides per 100,000 
people per year in 1957 to a high of 10.2 in 1980.87 There was a material 
upsurge in rates across most categories of major crimes, including rape, 
assault, robbery, and theft.88 This outburst of crime left behind many 
more victims than the nation’s criminal justice system had previously 
been required to handle. 
In 1966, the crime wave led to the formation of the President’s 
Commission on Law Enforcement and the formation of the 
Administration of Justice, which conducted the first national 
victimization survey.89 The survey showed that victimization rates were 
far higher than would be indicated by the statistics disclosed by law 
enforcement figures.90 The study revealed that many victims failed to 
report crimes because they distrusted the justice system.91 Simply 
stated, victims believed that the system was not working for them. 
Recognizing that the existing criminal justice system was failing 
many victims, the government determined that there was a need to 
provide better support to victims. Initial state action to remedy this 
problem came in the form of victim compensation programs, and the 
early compensation programs were designed as welfare programs to 
provide help to victims in need. California initiated the first state victim 
compensation program in 1965, soon followed by New York. By 1979, 
there were 28 state compensation programs.92 
As later programs were developed, states began to focus less on the 
needs of the victims—the center of welfare concerns—and more on the 
deserved justice for the victim.93 Victims’ needs were no longer part of 
the calculation. As Supreme Court Justice A.J. Goldberg commented in 
 
 86. Marlene Young & John Stein, The History of the Crime Victims’ Movement in the United 
States (Dec. 2004), https://www.ncjrs.gov/ovc_archives/ncvrw/2005/pdf/historyofcrime.pdf, at 1. 
 87. STEVEN PINKER, THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE: WHY VIOLENCE HAS 
DECLINED (2011) 107. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Young & Stein, supra note 86, at 2.   
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
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regards to victim compensation, “[i]n a fundamental sense, then, one 
who suffers the impact of criminal violence is also the victim of society’s 
long inattention to poverty and social injustice . . . .”94 At root, the victim 
compensation programs were molded to remedy society’s inability to 
prevent the circumstances surrounding crime. 
The victim compensation programs precipitated an expansion of 
similar reforms. The increase in serious crimes took an especially heavy 
and unprecedented toll on women in the form of increased domestic 
abuse, leaving many victimized women without the post-trauma 
support they needed.95 Leaders of the feminist movement immediately 
saw the need to provide additional support programs to victims of rape 
and domestic violence.96 This led to the development of victim 
assistance programs, which focused on non-financial mechanisms of 
support. The first three victim assistance programs in the United States 
all began in 1972, and “two were rape crisis centers (in Washington, 
D.C., and the San Francisco Bay area).”97 The Department of Justice, in 
a report examining the history and development of the victims’ rights 
movement, noted that there were two significant contributions that 
these programs brought to the victims’ movement: (1) “emotional crisis 
was recognized as a critical part of the injury inflicted,”98 and (2) 
“intervenors learned to help victims with the practical consequences of 
rebuilding their lives, rather than relying on a criminal justice system 
where they were too often mistreated.”99 These initiatives formed the 
basis for the growth of what has now developed into broad victims’ 
rights statutes across the country.100 
Victims’ rights programs have expanded greatly since their 
beginnings in the 1970s. There are over 32,000 statutes nationwide that 
define and protect victims’ rights.101 In 2004, after much debate 
surrounding proposed victims’ rights legislation, Congress passed the 
 
 94. A.J. Goldberg, Preface: Symposium on Governmental Compensation for Victims of 
Violence. 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1970). 
 95. See Young & Stein, supra note 86, at 2 (“Their leaders saw sexual assault and domestic 
violence – and the poor response of the criminal justice system – as potent illustrations of a 
woman’s lack of status, power, and influence.”). 
 96. See id. (“The new feminisits immediately saw the need to provide special care to victims 
of rape and domestic violence.”). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id.  
 100. See id. (“There is little doubt that the women’s movement was central to the development 
of a victims’ movement.”). 
 101. See Young & Stein, supra note 86, at 8.  
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Crime Victims’ Rights Act102 in an effort to codify the national efforts 
to protect the rights of crime victims and afford them the respect they 
deserve during the prosecution and sentencing of offenders. 
Unfortunately, in far too many cases, victims’ rights statutes are not 
fully enforced, leaving victims feeling frustrated and left out by the 
criminal justice system.103 In response, a number of states have elevated 
victims’ rights to a constitutional level.104 By enshrining certain rights 
within their constitutions, states emphasize the importance of 
recognizing victims throughout the justice process and promote their 
dignity by ensuring the enforcement of the support and protections 
they are guaranteed.105 Currently, 35 states have amended their state 
constitutions to include some form of a victims’ rights amendment.106 
 
 102. Crime Victims’ Rights Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C § 3771 (2004) 
 103. See, e.g., United States v. Atlantic States Cast Iron Pipe Co., 612 F. Supp. 2d 453, 532 
(D.N.J. 2009) (finding a narrow, exclusive definition of the term “statutory crime victim”).   
 104. See, e.g., AL. CONST. amend. 557(a) (“Crime victims . . . are entitled to the right to be 
informed, to be present, and to be heard when authorized, at all crucial stages of criminal 
proceedings, to the extent that these rights do not interfere with the constitutional rights of the 
person accused of committing the crime.”). 
 105. Marsy’s Law Foundation is a leading proponent of victims’ rights state constitution 
amendments. The stated purpose of the amendment is to “preserve and protect the right of crime 
victims to justice, to ensure crime victims a meaningful role throughout criminal and juvenile 
justice systems, and to ensure that crime victims’ rights and interests are respected and protected 
by law in a manner no less vigorous than the protections afforded to criminal defendants and 
juvenile delinquents.” It provides a very extensive list of enumerated rights in a piece of model 
legislation that is designed to set the framework for state’s victims’ rights amendments across the 
country. Enumerated rights of note include: the right to have the safety and welfare of the victim 
and the victim’s family considered when setting bail or making release decisions; the right to 
privacy, which includes the right to refuse an interview, deposition or other discovery request and 
to set reasonable conditions on the conduct of any such interaction to which the victim consents; 
the right to be heard in any proceeding involving release, plea, sentencing, adjudication, or parole, 
and any proceeding during which a right of the victim is implicated; the right to confer with the 
prosecuting attorney; the right to provide information regarding the impact of the offender’s 
conduct on the victim and the victim’s family to the individual responsible for conducting any pre 
sentence investigation or compiling any pre sentence investigation report, and to have any such 
information considered in any sentencing recommendations submitted to the court; and the right 
to receive a copy of any pre sentence report, and any other report or record relevant to the 
exercise of a victim’s right, except for those portions made confidential by law.  See Marsy’s Law 
For All, Marsy’s Law: A Model Constitutional Amendment To Afford Victims Equal Rights, 
https://www.nacdl.org/getattachment/bfffdaa7-ad92-4394-b85a-1215b771c5e1/marsys-law-model-
constitutional-amendment.pdf. 
 106. Anne Teigen, Rights for Crime Victims on the Ballot in Six States, THE NCSL BLOG (Oct. 
12, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/blog/2018/10/12/rights-for-crime-victims-on-the-ballot-in-six-
states.aspx.  
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Though there is some variation among the federal107 and state108 
victims’ rights laws, most have the following basic components: 
(1) the right to be treated with dignity, respect and sensitivity by law 
enforcement and other officials throughout the criminal justice 
process;109 
(2) the right to be informed about the services and resources 
available to victims as well as what to expect from the criminal 
justice system, including notice of significant events in the judicial 
process such as bail and plea proceedings, trial, sentencing and 
appeals;110 
(3) the right to protection from the criminal actor including threats, 
intimidation or retaliation during criminal proceedings;111 
(4) the right to seek crime victim compensation to reimburse for 
expenses resulting from the crime which typically include medical 
and counseling expenses and funeral expenses;112 
(5) the right to restitution from the offender so as to hold him or her 
directly responsible to the victim for the financial harm caused 
which typically include lost wages, property loss and insurance 
deductibles;113 
(6) the right to the prompt return of personal property which may 
have been used as evidence in criminal proceedings;114 
(7) the right to criminal justice proceedings free from unreasonable 
delay including the right to a speedy trial;115 
 
 107. See, e.g., Crime Victims’ Rights Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C § 3771 (2004) (enumerating 10 
explicit rights guaranteed to victims by the federal government). 
 108. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 960.001 (2019); 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 120 (2015); 18 Pa. C.S. § 
11.101 (2007); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. Art. I, § 30 (2017).  
 109. See Office of Justice Programs, supra note 85, at 1 (including “[t]he right to be treated 
with fairness, dignity, sensitivity, and respect”).  
 110. See id. (including “[t]he right to be informed of proceedings and events in the criminal 
justice process, including the release or escape of the offender, legal rights and remedies, and 
available benefits and services, and access to records, referrals, and other information”).  
 111. See id. (including “[t]he right to protection from intimidation and harassment”). 
 112. See id. (including “[t]he right to apply for crime victim compensation”).  
 113. See id. (including “[t]he right to restitution from the offender”). 
 114. See id. (including “[t]he right to the expeditious return of personal property seized as 
evidence whenever possible”). 
 115. See id. (including “[t]he right to a speedy trial and other proceedings free from 
unreasonable delay”). 
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(8) the right to submit a victim’s impact statement during the 
sentencing or parole phase of criminal proceedings describing how 
the crime has affected them, and; 
(9) the right to the enforcement of victims’ rights.116 
Upon review of the enumerated rights articulated by these 
statutory schemes, there is a clear emphasis on establishing the dignity 
and security of the victim. These laws seek to return the victim to 
normalcy. They are focused specifically on rebuilding the victim’s 
emotional and financial stability after the crime. However, the statutes 
do not hint at providing a means for victims to firmly engage in the 
punishment process.117 
The judiciary’s consideration of the Crime Victims’ Rights Act 
demonstrates that the goal of victims’ rights is to provide a sense of 
dignity and closure. In 2004, Congress passed the Crime Victims’ Rights 
Act (“CVRA”).118 In Kenna v. U.S. District Court for the Central District 
of California,119 the Ninth Circuit interpreted the CVRA. Here, crime 
victims who were victimized by two separate defendants filed suit to 
enforce their victim participation rights.120 The victims were granted the 
 
 116. See id. (including “[t]he right to enforcement of these rights and access to other available 
remedies”). 
 117. See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33679, CRIME VICTIMS’ RIGHTS 
ACT: A SUMMARY AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2015) 28–29 (“In capital cases, 
victim impact statements are constitutionall precluded from including ‘characterizations and 
opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence.’”).  
 118. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a) (2012). The enumerated rights include:  
(1) The right to be reasonably protected from the accused; (2) The right to reasonable, 
accurate, and timely notice of any public court proceeding, or any parole proceeding, 
involving the crime or of any release or escape of the accused; (3) The right not to be 
excluded from any such public court proceeding, unless the court, after receiving clear 
and convincing evidence, determines that testimony by the victim would be materially 
altered if the victim heard other testimony at that proceeding; (4) The right to be 
reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court involving release, plea, 
sentencing, or any parole proceeding; (5) The reasonable right to confer with the 
attorney for the Government in the case; (6) The right to full and timely restitution as 
provided in law; (7) The right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay; (8) The 
right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy; (9) 
The right to be informed in a timely manner of any plea bargain or deferred prosecution 
agreement; (10) The right to be informed of the rights under this section and the services 
described in section 503(c) of the Victims’ Rights and Restitution Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 
10607(c)) and provided contact information for the Office of the Victims’ Rights 
Ombudsman of the Department of Justice.  
The Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act added the language in (9) and (10). Pub. L. No. 114–
22, § 113(a)(1), 129 Stat. 240 (2015). 
 119. Kenna v. United States Dist. Court for C.D. Cal., 435 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2006) 
subsequent mandamus proceeding sub nom. In re Kenna, 453 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 120. Id. at 1012–13.  
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opportunity to speak at the sentencing hearing for the first defendant 
but denied the opportunity to speak at the second defendant’s 
hearing.121 
In holding that the CVRA granted the victims an “indefeasible 
right to speak”122 at both hearings, the court observed that a prime goal 
of the CVRA was to “force the defendant to confront the human cost 
of his crime” and “to allow the victim ‘to regain a sense of dignity and 
respect rather than feeling powerless and ashamed.’”123 The court 
further remarked that “the CVRA gives victims the right to confront 
every defendant who has wronged them; speaking at a co-defendant’s 
sentencing does not vindicate the right of the victims to look this 
defendant in the eye and let him know the suffering his misconduct has 
caused.”124 
Analogous to the issue before the court in Kenna, one development 
of the victims’ rights movement has been the utilization of victim 
impact statements during sentencing hearings. Such statements provide 
opportunities for victims or their families to have a voice in the 
sentencing phase of a criminal proceeding. 
Historically, crime victims or their families were not entitled to offer 
their opinions as to the appropriateness of a punishment, including the 
death penalty, during the sentencing phase of a criminal proceeding. As 
the court held in Robinson v. Maynard, “because the offense [of 
murder] was committed not against the victim but against the 
community as a whole . . . only the community, speaking through the 
jury, has the right to determine what punishment should be 
administered.”125 Victim impact statements ameliorated to some 
degree what many saw as this harsh result. 
Victims claim that the statements “rectify the imbalance pervading 
criminal courtroom proceedings by allowing them to participate in the 
prosecution of” the person who violated them or their family 
 
 121. See id. at 1013 (Three months later, at Zvi’s sentencing, the district court heard from the 
prosecutor and the defendant . . . . But the court denied the victims the opportunity to speak.”). 
 122. Id. at 1016. 
 123. Id. (quoting Jayne W. Barnard, Allocution for Victims of Economic Crimes, 77 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 39, 41 (2001)). 
 124. Id. at 1017. 
 125. Robinson v. Maynard, 829 F.2d 1501, 1505 (10th Cir. 1987).  
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member.126 Advocates further contend that the statements provide a 
means of coping, closure, and recovery.127 
Victim impact statements have been especially influential in the 
sentencing of capital crimes. Specifically, victim impact statements have 
become vehicles through which victims of crimes can describe how they 
have been damaged physically and psychologically by the crime and 
ask that the offender be appropriately punished. With respect to federal 
crimes, United States Attorney’s Offices solicit victim impact 
statements for a number of purposes: 
[A victim impact statement] provides an opportunity to express in 
your own words what you, your family, and others close to you have 
experienced as a result of the crime. Many victims also find it helps 
provide some measure of closure to the ordeal the crime has caused. 
The victim impact statement assists the judge when he or she 
decides what sentence the defendant should receive. Although the 
judge will ordinarily decide the defendant’s sentenced primarily 
based on the pre-sentence report and certain sentencing guidelines, 
the judge should consider your opinion before making a decision.128 
The Supreme Court has recognized the constitutionality of victim 
impact statements used specifically in the sentencing phase of death 
penalty cases. In Payne v. Tennessee, the Court held that testimony from 
a murder victim’s family could be admitted during the sentencing phase 
of the trial without violating the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause 
of the Eighth Amendment.129 
 
 126. Beth E. Sullivan, Harnessing Payne: Controlling the Admission of Victim Impact 
Statements to Safeguard Capital Sentencing Hearings from Passion and Prejudice, 25 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 601, 623 (1998).  
 127. See id. at 611 (“Two concerns seem to govern the movement: (1) the desire for the victim 
to obtain closure and regain a sense of control over life, and (2) the concern for retributive 
justice.”). 
 128. United States Department of Justice, United States Attorney’s Office, District of Alaska, 
Victim Impact Statements, http://www.justice.gov/usao-ak/victim-impact-statements. All 50 
states permit victim impact statements as part of the criminal sentencing phase.  
 129. 501 U.S. 808 (1991). It should be noted that this overruled prior precedent. The court 
first addressed the role of victim impact statements in Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987). 
There, the defendant was convicted of robbing and murdering an elderly couple. Id. at 498. A 
victim impact statement was admitted during the sentencing phase which resulted in the 
defendant being sentenced to death. Id. The Court held in a five to four decision that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibited the use of victim impact statements in death penalty cases as the 
emotional impact of such evidence may lead to the imposition of the death penalty in an arbitrary 
and capricious manner. Id. at 503. The Supreme Court revisited the role of victim impact 
statements in South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989). There, the Court held that victim 
impact statements were unconstitutional, as they contain personal characteristics of victims which 
were irrelevant to the defendant’s blameworthiness. Id. at 811–12. 
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The facts underlying Payne are particularly egregious. Payne was 
convicted of the brutal stabbing murders of a twenty-eight year old 
mother and her two-year-old daughter.130 At the sentencing phase of 
the trial, the prosecutor presented the testimony of the murder victim’s 
mother concerning the affects the crimes had on the victim’s family.131 
Payne was sentenced to death on both murder counts.132 
The Supreme Court of Tennessee upheld the conviction and 
sentence.133 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
consider whether “the Eighth Amendment prohibits a capital 
sentencing jury from considering ‘victim impact’ evidence relating to 
the personal characteristics of the victim and the emotional impact of 
the crimes on the victim’s family.”134 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing 
for the majority, held that “a State may properly conclude that for a 
jury to assess meaningfully the defendant’s moral culpability and 
blameworthiness, it should have before it at the sentencing phase 
evidence of the specific harm caused by the defendant.”135 Victims of 
capital crimes, therefore, now have an outlet to describe why the 
offender’s punishment should be proportional to the harm which was 
caused. 
There has not been a universal endorsement of the use of victim 
impact statements, particularly in capital cases. As Justice Stevens 
wrote in his dissent in Payne, the victim impact statement creates a 
“‘tactical dilemma’ for the defendant because it allows the possibility 
that the jury will be so distracted by prejudicial and irrelevant 
considerations that it will base its life-or-death decision on whim or 
caprice.”136 
For example, consider the case of James Bernard Campbell.137 A 
few days before Christmas in 1986, Sue Zann Bosler and her father, 
Reverend Billy Bosler, returned home from Christmas shopping.138 The 
doorbell rang, and Rev. Bosler opened the door.139 As Bosler heard the 
 
 130. Payne, 501 U.S. at 808.  
 131. Id. at 815–16. 
 132. Id. at 816. 
 133. Id.   
 134. Id. at 817.  
 135. Id. at 825. 
 136. Id. at 864 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 506–07 
(1987)). 
 137. Campbell v. State, 571 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1990) 
 138. Id. at 416. 
 139. Id.  
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door opening, she also heard her father making grunting sounds.140 
Bosler rushed to the door to find her father being brutally stabbed by 
an unknown attacker, later accused to be Campbell.141 When Bosler 
tried to help her father, the assailant backed her into another room and 
stabbed her in the head several times.142 She fell to the floor, pretending 
to be dead.143 The attacker rummaged through the house and searched 
Rev. Bosler’s pockets and Bosler’s purse, taking an undetermined 
amount of money before leaving.144 Rev. Bosler died, but Sue Zann 
lived.145 
James Bernard Campbell was charged with Rev. Bosler’s murder.146 
At his first of multiple trials, Campbell was convicted of first degree 
murder.147 During his sentencing hearing, Bosler was invited to give a 
victim impact statement.148 She gave a “‘deep,’” “‘dramatic,’” and 
“‘moving’” account of her own life and the impact of her father’s 
legacy.149 She was described as the prosecution’s “‘blockbuster 
witness.’”150 Campbell was sentenced to death at that hearing.151 
After multiple courts reversed his sentence on technicalities, 
Campbell was tried and sentenced two additional times.152 Bosler gave 
a victim’s impact statement at each hearing. However, at the later 
hearings, she changed the tone of her statement. Instead of offering a 
grieving, emotional story about her father, she told the jury an 
“unsympathetic and undramatic” account of her life and her 
livelihood.153 At the third sentencing hearing, Bolser told the jury of 
how she is a hair stylist, and how she rejects the death penalty.154 Within 
three hours, the jury returned with a sentence of life imprisonment, as 
opposed to the death penalty.155 
 
 140. Id.  
 141. Id.  
 142. Id.  
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See id. (quoting 48 Hours: My Father’s Killer (CBS television broadcast, Oct. 2, 1997)). 
 150. See id. (quoting 48 Hours: My Father’s Killer (CBS television broadcast, Oct. 2, 1997)). 
 151. Id. at 602. 
 152. Id.  
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
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This case is a prime example of how an emotionally charged victim 
impact statement can materially affect sentencing, and if used to enrage 
or inflame the emotions of a sentencing judge or jury, could be used to 
exact revenge on a criminal defendant. Under almost the exact same 
conditions, the tone of a victim impact statement dramatically affected 
the outcome of the sentence for identical capital crimes. 
In that vein, victim impact statements may merely serve to satisfy 
the victim’s desire to play a role in determining punishment. By 
achieving the goal of providing victims a “voice” in sentencing, victim 
impact statements indulge and facilitate a victim’s desire to cause the 
wrongdoer pain. Catherine Bendor writes, “[t]he only clear role for this 
evidence is to serve as a direct appeal to the emotional sympathies of 
the jurors, or to lead them to base their decision on an assessment of 
the value of the victim’s life and the extent to which a victim is missed 
by survivors.”156 
Opponents of the use of victim impact statements also argue that 
such inputs could lead to vengeful justice.157 Critics claim that a victim’s 
opinion on sentencing is “irrelevant to any legitimate sentencing factor, 
lacks probative value in a system of public prosecution, and is likely to 
be highly prejudicial.”158 Because of this reality, victim impact 
statements may play into the hands of prosecutors. Prosecutors are 
aware of the persuasive impact of victim impact statements and “may 
be more inclined to seek the death penalty in those cases” which 
present a sympathetic victim with a story, “whose family’s victim 
impact statement can help them to secure” the death penalty.159 Such 
statements allow the criminal justice system to be potentially 
influenced by a family’s search for vengeance. 
CONCLUSION 
As is reflected in Justice Brennan’s opinion in Furman, America has 
historically and collectively thought itself above killing “criminals 
 
 156. Catherine Bendor, Defendants’ Wrongs and Victims’ Rights: Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. 
Ct. 2597 (1991), 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 219, 236 (1992).  
 157. See Edna Erez, Victim Participation in Sentencing: And the Debate Goes On, 3 INT’L REV. 
OF VICTIMOLOGY 17, 19 (1994) (“Opponents of victim integration in the criminal justice process 
often portray the victim as a vindictive individual whose main onjective in providing input will be 
to ensure severe punishment of the offender.”). 
 158. D. R. Hellerstein, Victim Impact Statement: Reform or Reprisal, 27 AM. CRIM. L. Rev. 
391, 429 (1989).  
 159. Amy K. Phillips, Thou Shalt Not Kill Any Nice People: The Problem of Victim Impact 
Statements in Capital Sentencing, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 93, 113 (1997). 
RYAN FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2020  10:38 AM 
198 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 15 
simply to get even with them.”160 There has arguably been a paradigm 
shift in the American political and criminal justice system whereby 
revenge, so long as administered by the state, is an acceptable and 
legitimizing justification for punishment, including the death penalty. 
Now, the American criminal justice system is the model venue for the 
vindication of victims’ rights which Professor Eisenstat described: 
The law is the only venue which can provide victims with one source 
of their recovery; that is knowledge that their offender has been 
adequately punished. If the law fails to perform that function, then 
society faces the very perils which forced the state to first interject 
itself into resolving disputes between its citizens; that individuals 
will seek revenge on their own, thus leading us back to the days of 
the blood feud.161 
Having now assumed the responsibility to carry out state 
sanctioned revenge, it is unclear whether legal and political forces can 
direct the American criminal justice system to impose this punishment 
in a fair and just manner. 
What is clear is that the pendulum has swung from a fundamental 
focus on the protection of the rights of the perpetrator as reflected in 
the Court’s various opinions in Furman, to a recognition in Gregg that 
those convicted of crimes are deserving of punishment (including the 
death penalty). This recognition of retributive justice has resulted in the 
development of victim oriented legislative schemes designed to protect 
and promote the rights and dignity of the victims of crimes. 
Perhaps the imposition of the death penalty is in fact constitutional 
and not a violation of a criminal defendant’s Eighth Amendment rights. 
We also may assume that the recognition of the rights and dignity of 
crime victims is a legitimate state interest worthy of protection. 
However, like all pendulum swings, there is the danger of 
overcorrection and misplaced emphasis. 
Protecting the rights of crime victims and their families does not 
necessarily require an overblown reliance on the passionate testimony 
of a victim or his or her family. Looking out for the rights of victims 
 
 160. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 305 (1972). For example, soon after the World Trade 
Center Attack in 2001, President George W. Bush, in an address to the FBI, confirmed that the 
United States intended to take the war on terror to the Taliban. President Bush explained that, 
“[O]urs is a nation that does not seek revenge, but we do seek justice.” Thane Rosenbaum, Eye 
for an Eye: The Case for Revenge, THE CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (March 26, 2013), 
https://www.chronicle.com/article/The-Case-for-Revenge/138155 (March 15, 2020). 
 161. Eisenstat, supra note 22, at 1151–52.  
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also does not necessarily require that penalties be imposed for the 
express purpose of causing the victim to suffer out of revenge for the 
suffering the offender caused. We must heed the words of Justice 
Gorsuch that a prisoner condemned to death is not guaranteed a 
painless death, perhaps because of the pain he inflicted. Nonetheless, 
we similarly should never forget the profound observation of Justice 
Brennan that as a society, “we have no desire to kill criminals simply to 
get even with them.”162 Revenge simply has no legitimate role to play 
in our criminal justice system. 
 
 
 162. Furman, 408 U.S. at 305. 
